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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
as authority. However, the Willis holding, that a separation
agreement is not sufficiently commercial in nature to -constitute
the transaction of business, has. been seriously unde.mined by
subsequent cases.2 0  In addition, New York judgments, juris-
dictiollally based upon separation agreements which were con-
strued to be the transaction of business under 302 have been
given full faith and credit, in both Maryland 21 and Massa-
chusetts.22
Although a separation agreement is arguably not a "commer-
cial transaction," there are normally extensive provisions for divi-
sion of property, apportionment of income, and the erection of tax
structure, which are the result of commercial-like bargaining be-
tween the parties. Such arrangements do not affect the marital
status and are primarily financial. If there were a separation agree-
ment involved here, or if the court's decision was influenced by
the Willis "non-transaction" viewpoint, this case might be rethought
in view of the more recent cases that have stressed the commercial
earmarks of such agreements and held them to be sufficient trans-
actions of business to trigger 302(a)(1). However, if the action
was based upon, the marital res alone, 302 is inapplicable and the
statement as to separation agreements .'hould be regarded as dictum.
CPLR 308(4): Court of Appeals, establishes guidelines
for substituted service.
After-past doubt as to what methods of substituted service
will be satisfactory, 2 under CPLR 308(4), the Court of Appeals
has recently provided three cases,* which can safely serve as a
basis for fashioning court-ordered service.
Dobkin v., Chapman, Sellars v. Raye and Keller v. Rappoport 24
20 Kochenthal v. Kochenthal, 52 Misc. 24 437, 275 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1966); Todd v. Todd, 51 Misc: 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S2d 455
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966) (dictum).2 1 Van .Wagenrg v. Van. Wagenberg, 241 Md. 154,.,215 A.2d 812,
cert. denie.d, 385 U.S. 833 (1966).
22 Spitz v. Spitz, 22 Mass. App.- Dec. (16 Legalite 278) 195 (1966).
2See, e.g., Sellars v. Raye, 25 App. Div. 2d 757, 269 N.Y.S2d 7(2d
Dep't 1966); Dobdn V., Chapman, 25 App. Div. 2d 745, 269 NY.S.2d 49 (2d
Dep't 1966); Deredito v. Winn, 23 App. Div. 2d 849, 259 N.Y.S.2d 200(2d ep't 1965); "Winterstehi v. Pollard, 50 Misc. 2d 354, 270 N.Y.S.2d
525 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966). See generally The Quarterly Survey
of New York Practice, 42 'ST. Jotm's *L. REV. "283, 289 (1967); TheQuarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 STr. Toroms L. Rnv. 642; 648-
49 (1967); The Quarterly Survey oft New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 463, 475-76 (1967); The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice,
41 ST. JoiN's L. RE . 279, 296-98 -(1966); A Biannual Survey of New
York Practice, 40 ST. JoHin's L. REv. .122, 140-42 (1965).24 Dobkn. v. Chapnian, 21 N.Y.2d 490,236, N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S2d 161
(1968). The three cases were consolidated for argument, before ihe Court
of Appeals.
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were actions for personal injuries resulting from automobile
accidents in New York. In Dobkin, after various attempts to
secure service failed, the court ordered that ordinary mail could
be used to serve a summons at the address received from the
defendants at the scene of the accident. Service was upheld in
spite of two strong indications that the defendants no longer
lived at the address, that is, certified and registered mail was
returned by the Post Office and the Sheriff in the county was
unable to locate the defendants.
Sellars and Keller evidenced similar indications that the de-
fendants could not be found at the address available to the
plaintiffs. In Sellars the court ruled that the steps already
taken to secure service under the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which
had not produced the required proof of delivery, would be sufficient
under 308(4), if the summons and order were published in a
designated newspaper in the defendant's locale. In Keller the
court ordered service to be made by mailing a summons and
complaint to the defendant's last known address in New York
and by delivering a copy of the same to his insurance carrier,
recognizing it as the real party in interest.
The Court of Appeals in affirming the cases developed one
rationale suitable to support all three. It was noted that sub-
sections 1 to 3 of CPLR 308 were precise directives of the method
to be used to obtain personal service, and that sub-section 4 by its
wording was meant to cover situations in which the other more
exact procedures could not apply. In implementing sub-section 4
the Court found no limitation on its discretion either as a result of
the actual language of the statute, which reads without limitations,
or from an examination of the legislative history of the section.
The report of the legislative committees 215 indicates that sub-
section 3, with its specific provisions, was "calculated to insure that
actual notice is given to the defendant." However, when this
cannot be achieved the court may provide a procedure under sub-
section 4. The aim of the entire revision of article 3 was "[t]o
make it possible . . . to take full advantage of the state's con-
stitutional power over persons and things." 28 From this statutory
review the Court concluded that service might occasionally fail to
bring actual notice to the defendant, but that the only limitation
which necessarily had to control a court-ordered service was the
constitutional limit of due process. This requires not actual notice
but a sufficient opportunity to receive actual notice.
Due process must represent a realistic appraisal of the right
of the defendant as well as the right of the plaintiff. The Court
recognized that, in certain cases, "even a probably futile means
2G5 Fvr Pp. 266.
26 SEcoD RIE. 37.
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of notification is all that the situation permits.".27 The primary
justification for upholding such "futile" service comes from an
examination of the defendant's duties following an accident, and
from an examination of the feasible methods for locating the
defendant that are left open to the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals felt that anyone involved in a serious
automobile accident is aware that he may be involved in a suit.
He, therefore, as a potential defendant, has a duty to keep his
whereabouts known by contacting either the other parties involved,
his insurance company, or the post office. In concluding, the
Court also pointed out how the interplay of CPLR 317 with CPLR
308 may prevent any harsh results by allowing a defendant, who
was not personally served, and who did not appear, to be relieved
of a default judgment within the proper time and under the proper
circumstances.
CPLR 308(4): Designee faced with procedural dilemma.
In Cosby v. Moyant,28 the defendants' attorney was designated
to receive process on defendants' behalf, pursuant to court order
under CPLR 308(4) .2 9 The attorney attempted to make a special
appearance to object to the designation on the grounds that he
was not representing the defendants in the matter in issue.
The Court held, however, that since the enactment of CPLR
320(b) the procedure of making a special appearance to contest
jurisdiction has been abandoned 30 and that such challenges can
now be asserted only by motion or in a responsive pleading.
It is submitted that, where the court has deemed it appropriate
to serve a summons through a designee, that individual should have
a simple procedure to challenge whether or not he is in fact a
proper designee. There is at present no procedure set forth in the
CPLR for such a challenge and the designee is thus faced with a
dilemma. He might be left in a position of potential liability to
the defendant for not redelivering the service, yet, he might be
totally unaware of who the defendant is or how to locate him.
Furthermore, if the designee must appear either by motion or by
a responsive pleading of the defendant, it must be assumed that
the party served is not only the proper designee for service but
that he has authority to appear for the defendant. This authority
27 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317
(1950).
28 55 Misc. 2d 393i 285 N.Y.S2d 980 (Sup. Ct, N.Y. County 1967).
29Service has been allowed upon someone other than the defendant when
it is shown that his relationship to the defendant is such that it is reason-
ably probable that the defendant will become aware of the action. See
7B McKixNEY's CPLR 308(4), supp. commentary 132 (1966).
30See 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 320, commentary 577-78 (1963).
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